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I. CHANGING SOVEREIGNTY AND DIGNITY
Sovereignty discussions in the United States and elsewhere have multiple
dimensions. 1 One set of concerns, which we group under the term "external
sovereignty," focuses on the prerogatives of the United States vis-a-vis other
nations-to participate (or not) in new legal institutions such as the
International Criminal Court,2 to join (or not) transnational agreements such as
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
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1. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 2-42
(1999) (delineating four uses of sovereignty--domestic, international legal, interdependence,
and Westphalian-and pointing out their logical inconsistencies).
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See generally THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE (Roy S. Lee ed.,
1999) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT]; Allison Marston Danner,
Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the
Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1633 (2003).
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Women (CEDAW), 3 to use (or not) opinions of other nations' courts in the
development of domestic legal norms, and to engage (or not) in dialogues
through adjudication to articulate international norms. 4 External sovereignty is
about the literal and legal power of the United States in its relationship to other
nations and to the world community.
The term sovereignty in the United States is also deployed in reference to
relationships among governments within this country's borders. This "internal
sovereignty" talk arises when states claim prerogatives of lawmaking free from
"interference" by federal law5 and when Indian tribes seek release from
constraints imposed by either states or the federal government. 6 In recent
years, the current majority of the United States Supreme Court has revived the
language of state sovereignty-proffering it as the basis for invalidating federal
legislation altogether 7 or for concluding that federal legislation cannot endow
claimants with certain rights against states. 8 The Court's internal sovereignty
3. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979) [hereinafter CEDA W], discussed infra notes 61, 226-29 and accompanying text.
4. See Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863 (2003) (discussing the methods by which domestic
systems can incorporate or accommodate transnational law).
5. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (addressing the
Supreme Court of Virginia's asserted right to be free from federal judicial power); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (concluding that federal law cannot "commandeer" state
officials to implement federal legislation); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001) (holding that Congress could not, without a better factual record and a more
narrowly tailored remedy, impose obligations on states to pay damages for violations of
certain rights of the disabled).
6. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that a state county could exercise zoning authority over a tribe
despite its claim to sovereignty); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
(holding tribal courts lacked power to try non-Indians).
Conceptually, discussions of tribes could, depending on one's viewpoint, be located in
either discussions of internal or external sovereignty. From the vantage point of U.S. law,
tribes are demi-sovereigns, which under current Supreme Court formulations only have that
sovereignty accorded to them by federal law. From the vantage point of some tribes, they
are fully sovereign nations, struggling for legal independence. See generally Philip P.
Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian
Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling
Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law,
107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States,
and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding unconstitutional
the Civil Rights Remedy in the Violence Against Women Act as beyond congressional
power under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz, 521 U.S. 898
(holding unconstitutional federal legislation requiring local officials to assist in background
checks for gun purchases); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 to exceed congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
8. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356 (holding that Congress could not impose
monetary liability on states for violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Age Discrimination in
Employment Act's (ADEA) abrogation of state sovereign immunity exceeded congressional
[Vol. 55:19211922
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argument is supported, in part, by characterizing states as bearers of dignitary
interests. For example, in 2002, a majority of the Supreme Court proclaimed
that "[t]he preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States
the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities." 9
This turn to dignity as a justification for or as an explanation of state power
within the United States is actually a return to an older conception of the
sovereign. Monarchs were the sovereigns to whom dignity belonged in eras
when ordinary persons were not due such respect and deference. 10  The
personal authority and dignity of royalty prompted an elaborate code of
interpersonal behavior, replete with rules dictating forms of address and
limiting permissible interactions between monarchs and their subjects. I I As
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(holding that Congress lacked power under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the
immunity of states from lawsuits brought pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002) (analyzing and criticizing several of the recent
decisions as legally and historically flawed).
As the Court has invigorated state sovereignty, it has also diminished the degree to
which Indian tribes can make claims of sovereignty. Compare Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353 (2001) (holding that tribal courts lacked authority to adjudicate a tribal member's claim
that state officials had wrongfully entered the Shoshone reservation to conduct a search and
that they were not courts of general jurisdiction), and Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S.
438 (1997) (holding that tribal jurisdiction did not reach a civil dispute of members with
nonmembers), with Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (recognizing tribal
jurisdiction as a matter of comity and stating that alleged incompetence of tribal court is not
among exceptions to exhaustion of remedies requirement), and Nat'l Farmers Union Ins.
Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (recognizing the exercise of federal
jurisdiction as potentially impairing tribal court authority).
9. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (holding that
sovereign immunity protected states from adjudication at a federal agency responding to a
private party's complaint of a violation of a federal statute regulating shipping); see also
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (commenting that "[t]he generation that designed
and adopted our federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign
dignity"); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997) (stating that "the dignity
and respect afforded a State, which the immunity is designed to protect, are placed in
jeopardy" by private suits in federal courts, regardless of the basis of federal courts'
jurisdiction); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 (suggesting that a purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment, in addition to protecting state treasuries, is to prevent states from the indignity
of being subject to private suits); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (permitting states to appeal the denial of sovereign immunity defenses
to ensure "that the States' dignitary interests can be fully vindicated").
10. See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES 39-71 (1989) (examining the transformations
from the 1530s to the 1690s in England and the obedience due to the monarchy, linked to the
mastery of God); Michael J. Meyer, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN
DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 1, 4-5 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992)
(discussing the revolutionary challenges that the French and American commitment to rights
posed to Burkean assumptions that dignity was what commoners lacked, because they had
"no rank").
11. HERZOG, supra note 10, at 52-57 (detailing which ranks could wear what fabrics
and in whose presence hats had to be removed).
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Justice Stevens has explained, "in a society where noble birth can justify
preferential treatment, it might have been unseemly to allow a commoner to
hale the monarch into court."
12
Dignity took a radical turn in the centuries that followed, as it became a
quintessentially personal trait of all human beings and a marker of equality.
Twentieth century human rights law embodies these premises through
proclamations and agreements committing governments to respecting the
dignity of all people. 13 Further, during the last several decades, collectives of
marginalized persons began to assert a legal right to recognition as status-
holding, self-determining nations or as collective rightsholders within either a
larger or another polity. 14 These groups are sovereigns of a different sort,
sometimes located on land controlled by other polities asserting authority.
12. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 96 (Stevens., J., dissenting).
13. The Preamble to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights opens with the
words: "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world." Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR. 3d
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Its first article declares: "All human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights." Id. art. I.
More specific transnational agreements have parallel provisions. See, e.g., International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan.
3, 1976) ("Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of
the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world"); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200a (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("Considering that, in accordance with the principles
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice, and peace"); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 352, 660 U.N.T.S. 195;
("Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms... without distinction of any kind, in particular as to race, colour or
national origin"); CEDAW, supra note 3, pmbl. ("Noting that the Charter of the United
Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person and in the equal rights of man and woman"). See generally Louis Henkin, Human
Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 210,
211-12.
14. See, e.g., Charter of the Assembly of First Nations pmbl. (2002)
(Canada) (identifying the reaffirmation of "dignity and worth" as one of its goals
and calling for "recognition and respect for their mutual sovereign equality")
[hereinafter First Nations Charter], available at http://www.afn.ca/About%20AFN/
charter of the assemblyof first.htm. See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-125 (1996) (describing the development of the norms
and transnational agreements and case law recognizing such rights); WILL KYML1CKA,
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995) (discussing
mechanisms to ensure voice for and toleration of minorities).
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The emergence during the twentieth century of dignity as a right of
individuals and the rejection of prior practices of colonization and
discrimination against racialized and ethnic groups impose constraints on
sovereignty 15 that illuminate the dynamic nature of the content of
sovereignty.1 6 So do innovations in technology, enabling global markets,
making security dependent on cooperation, and diminishing the saliency of
geography. 7
Some argue that such developments (or democracy itself) undermine the
utility and intelligibility of sovereignty, diminished in the wake of growing
economic, political, and environmental interdependencies.1 8 We think it useful
to focus instead on sovereignty's plasticity, no longer signaling total power nor
predicated only on physical boundaries but continuing to mark significant
amounts of authority and status. Whatever prerogatives governments once had,
they cannot-as a legal matter (see human rights law) and as a political matter
(see preemptive military strikes beyond one's national borders)-treat human
15. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 14, at 129-84 (analyzing various implementing
procedures for the provision of remedial and affirmative measures that recognize rights of
indigenous peoples to land, social welfare programs, and self-governance); KYMLICKA,
supra note 14, at 173-95 (arguing that national life can accommodate multiple allegiances
with attention paid to equality within and among groups); AvISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT
SOCIETY 173-76, 180-86 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996) (discussing the presence of
subgroups within a polity with their own forms of life and the obligations of "a decent
society" not to denigrate them, and to encompass groups with "competing and not merely
incompatible forms of life").
16. For example, the Draft Declaration claims forms of sovereignty that can be layered
or interwoven with other holders of power. See, e.g., Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples art. 4, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1
(1994) ("Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political,
economic, social and cultural characteristics, as well as their legal systems, while retaining
their rights to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and
cultural life of the State.").
17. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 13-33 (1995) (arguing the
interdependency of sovereigns); JEAN-MARIE GUtHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE
45-65 (Victoria Elliott trans., 1995) (arguing the importance of both local and global
conditions and the declining capacity of the nation to respond to economic and
environmental changes); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 1-30 (1995) (focusing on the effect of global markets and arguing that they
denationalize certain forms of power); Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 2029 (2003) (discussing the necessity of sovereignty to be responsive to changing
material, technological, and economic conditions).
18. See, e.g., Andrej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341 (arguing that sovereignty had no meaning
as a legal concept); see also HERZOG, supra note 10, at 77-80 (offering the phrase
"masterless men" to underscore how social ordering changed with the rise of consent
theory); id. at 215-47 (affirming yet questioning theories of consent). A somewhat different
argument is that formal attributes associated with sovereignty-such as territorial rights,
recognition, control, and autonomy-are regularly compromised by nations claiming to be
sovereign. See KRASNER, supra note 1, at 237.
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beings with utter disregard and assert sovereignty as an absolute defense to
their actions. The rise of dignity (inter alia) has changed the meaning of
sovereignty.
Given the nesting of dignity in personhood, the Supreme Court's insistence
on attributing dignity to states is seen by some as either obnoxious or
disingenuous. Objections arise from the anthropomorphism in general, 19 and
more specifically, from the association of this particular attribute with the
state. 20 One argument runs that, even if certain aspects of personality can
properly be associated with governmental entities, dignity is not the kind of
attribute states ought-as a philosophical, a political, or a legal matter-to
claim. Another is that the use of the term dignity in such contexts has no real
analytic purchase and deserves no attention in its own right.
We think that the turn to dignity in sovereignty discussions ought neither to
be dismissed nor embraced without puzzling about its deployment as the
twenty-first century begins. In this Article, we explore the role that the term
dignity plays in U.S. constitutional law. Specifically, we have scanned 200
years of decisionmaking by the United States Supreme Court to learn when,
where, and why the word has been used. That excavation in turn yields several
insights.
First, the word dignity was not used in reference to personal constitutional
rights in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence until the 1940s in the wake of
World War 11,21 when legal and political commentary around the world turned
to the term dignity to identify rights of personhood. In such correlation, we
identify causation. Without citation or reference to "foreign" sources, the
Supreme Court has, since World War 11 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, embedded the term dignity into the U.S. Constitution.22 As we
explain below, dignity talk in the law of the United States is an example of how
U.S. law is influenced by the norms of other nations, by transnational
experiences, and by international legal documents.
Second, we argue that the Supreme Court's reinvigoration of doctrines of
internal sovereignty by endowing states with dignity is driven in part by anxiety
occasioned by the very permeability of our legal system. Repeatedly during the
twentieth century, those focused on shoring up the external sovereignty of the
United States have relied on claims that the internal sovereignty of this
federation requires that the United States limit its involvement with
19. See Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 81, 84-85 (2001) (rejecting attributions of feeling but arguing that
dignitary concerns have an important role in underscoring states' expressive interests in
being understood as empowered to govern).
20. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76, 96-98 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Declaration of Independence and subsequent democratic
developments rejected the concept of an unaccountable and unquestionable sovereign).
21. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
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HeinOnline -- 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1926 2002-2003
DIGNITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
transnational legal and political activities. 23 Both the permeation of U.S. law
by international norms and the efforts to ward it off give rise to our third
conclusion: Given global activity and technology, U.S. law (and life within
this country) cannot be secured against external forces. Rather, this country's
law is inevitably in conversation (directly or indirectly) with legal
developments around the world.
24
Fourth, we believe that as a legal matter, dignity ought not to be reserved
exclusively to individuals. Through an analysis of the "caselaw of dignity," we
have found many examples of the utility of institutional dignity, enabling a
fledgling organization-be it a court or a nation-to function.25 This form of
dignity, akin to the Chayesian concept of sovereignty, 26 entails the idea of an
individual or an entity having the capacity to function, to be able (as an
instrumental matter) to accomplish something in the world. For clarity, we
speak of the dignity accorded to nonhumans as role-dignity, by which we mean
that respect is accorded to an entity in order to enable that entity to produce
something of value to persons or groups. In contrast, the dignity of people can
have instrumental utility but is not justified solely in reference to what other
goods it produces but rather as something that inheres in personhood.
27
Fifth, and finally, as we will elaborate, 28 legal recognition of institutional
role dignity ought to have a narrower ambit than legal recognition of individual
dignity. To endorse an entity's claim to role-dignity requires a contextual
evaluation of the purposes for which the dignity claim is made and an
assessment of the relative power of the entity claiming this attribute.
Specifically, because of revised understandings of the import of human dignity,
23. See infra notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
24. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997) (discussing transnational legal processes); Judith Resnik, Categorical
Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001) [hereinafter
Resnik, Categorical Federalism] (discussing transnational developments of women's rights
and their effects on United States's lawmaking); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New
World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183 (describing the disaggregation of state
processes and the role of both governmental and nongovernmental networks); see also Judith
Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary and Congressional Power, 78 IND.
L.J. 223 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal to permit federal courts to have the
remedial capacity now common in many countries to enjoin the transfer of assets pending
the outcome of a damages action).
25. See infra notes 110-32 and accompanying text.
26. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 17.
27. See MARGALIT, supra note 15, at 67-68; Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in
United States Constitutional Law, in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMs, 249, 250-51 (Dieter
Sion & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000); see also Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of
Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 10, 11-14 (distinguishing
different conceptions of dignity, one recognizing the capacity of a person to make claims
against other persons and a second inherent form, priceless and antecedent to rights). These
three commentators all rely on Kant for an understanding of persons treated as ends, not as
means.
28. See infra Part III.D.
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law ought not to rely on institutional role-dignity to permit an entity to avoid
accounting for its behavior towards individuals. Because "[s]overeignty, in the
end, is status,"'29 requiring sovereigns to account for actions through orderly
dialogue between individuals, entities, and governments ought not be
understood to be an insult to status. Rather than being conceived to be
insulting or humiliating, the very practice of adjudication should be seen as a
form of recognition of the status of democratic sovereigns, committed to
renewing their authority through processes of communication and mutual
consent.
Our approach eliminates a claim of role-dignity as a justification for
sovereign immunity. Taken further, it could also be used to abolish sovereign
immunity to the extent it exempts sovereigns from explaining their conduct.
This approach comports empirically with the increasing willingness of
democratic governments (including states within the United States, the federal
government and other nations within their own boundaries and in transnational
legal institutions) to submit to legal processes.
30
Our argument does not, however, require sovereigns to provide remedies
for all forms of misbehavior or to appear at all times and places to respond.
Accommodations to respect institutional role-dignity and to facilitate
governance may be crafted, for example, by courts limiting the kinds of
remedies to be imposed or by shaping special formats for adjudication of
disputes involving states. Further, we recognize that the endurance of states
within the United States and of nation states around the world is not a
happenstance of terrain. Rather, it is an artifact of constitutional text,
institutional interaction, and political practice.
Thus, our approach does not ignore the needs of states to shore up
institutional role-dignity. Other means-legal and political-enable states
within federations and nations to obtain and to retain authority. Examples in
U.S. law include the "equal footing doctrine" of states and limitations on
federal deployment of state actors through anticommandeering principles.
Other federations use different mechanisms, evidencing the ability of legal
systems to devise (and disagree about) mechanisms that enable authority.
What legal systems ought not to do is to identify as an insult or injury the
fact that a government has an obligation to explain its action to citizens or to
other governments. Democratic commitments to human dignity require
sovereigns to account in appropriate times and places for their behavior. That
accounting is in fact an aspect of the role-dignity of such governments for it
marks the fact of their authority and their power to affect humans-often times
generatively but sometimes harmfully.
29. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 17, at 27.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 184-91.
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II. THE IDEA, THE POLITICS, AND THE DEVELOPING LAW OF DIGNITY
Before turning to the law of dignity, we need to locate the concept. A
quick and overly simplified summary of a rich idea identifies many aspects.
Dignity accrues to individuals through their awareness of their status in their
own eyes and in the eyes of others. 3 1 Further, dignity represents a symbolic
status distinct from a person's material well-being. Dignity underscores the
equal worth of all persons. Moreover, dignity is used in reference to humans'
capacity to make decisions about their own lives.32 Dignity also engenders a
set of practices, linked to a person's bounded being. Because of a person's
dignity, other individuals and the state cannot treat a person in ways deemed to
intrude on physical and mental spaces reserved to the individual. Indeed, the
state cannot touch a person in certain ways.
But questions remain. Is dignity an independent attribute of personhood,
or is dignity a part of personhood related to, derived from, and/or a part of
autonomy, liberty, and equality? Is dignity transnational and ahistorical or is it
culture-dependent? Does the meaning of what constitutes an affront to dignity
have a gendered content?
These questions signal the lively debate about the boundaries of dignity
itself. Some claim for dignity a categorical valence, pronouncing the worth,
value, esteem, and deference owed to all human beings 33 and, it is occasionally
argued, also to animals. 34 Some relate dignity to religious commitments about
the sanctity of humans,3 5 while others locate dignity in human agreement or
conflict, as an artifact of interaction rather than as a predicate to it.36 For some,
individual dignity is a social undertaking, stemming from recognition of a
31. See generally Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM
AND "THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION" 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1992).
32. Id. at 30-40; see also MARGALIT, supra note 15, at 51-68.
33. See, e.g., Gewirth, supra note 27, at 12-28; Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a
Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 848 (1983).
34. See STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS
(2000); Steven M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution-The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for
Dignity-Rights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REV. 793 (1998). In contrast, others argue
that human respect for animals stems from obligations of humanity. See Martha C.
Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506, 1527
(2001) (book review) (citing an argument, based on Kantian approaches, that "animals have
worth and dignity only as instruments of human life and that we become cruel ourselves
when we treat animals cruelly").
35. See Michael J. Perry, Is the Idea of Human Rights Ineliminably Religious?, in
LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 205 (Thomas Kearns &
Austan Sarat eds., 1996); Dierk Ullrich, Concurring Visions: Human Dignity in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS at pt. 1I.B (2003) (discussing the Christian
theological origins of the link between dignity and humanity), available at
http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol3/issl/artl.
36. Jeffrey C. Isaac, A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity
and the Politics of Human Rights, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 61 (1996).
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person's identity and an acknowledgment of an individual's connection to
others as a part of a community. 37
Whether it is dignity or the expressions of dignity that vary by culture is
also contested, with some critics arguing that liberal Western democracies have
erred in assuming that a particular version of dignity (often linked to autonomy)
is universal. 38 That discussion suggests that claims for dignity can be deployed
for political purposes-for example, that liberalism's use of dignity (as well as
a cluster of related individual rights) is a mechanism for expanding ideologies
associated with particular nations. 39
Whether dignity has a gender is another question. A stress on dignity as
"self-control," predicated on claims to autonomy,40 ascribes to dignity
characteristics of individuality at odds with certain feminist arguments that
persons are situated and interrelational actors,4 1 deriving strength and dignity
from their ability to imbue themselves and others with the capacity to
flourish.42 Moreover, what constitutes a dignitary harm is plainly altered when
injuries to women are in foCUS. 43 For example, in 1977, through additions to
the Geneva Conventions, international humanitarian law prohibited "outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,
37. See Herbert C. Kelman, The Conditions, Criteria, and Dialectics of Human
Dignity, 21 INT'L STUD. Q. 529 (1977).
38. See Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of
Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 303 (1982); Rhoda E.
Howard & Jack Donnelly, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes, 80 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 801 (1986).
39. Although not focused on dignity per se, Michael Doyle's discussion of Kantian
claims in foreign affairs offers a ready example. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, in DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE 3, 3-56 (Michael E.
Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds., 1996).
40. See Michael J. Meyer, Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control, 99 ETHICS 520 (1989).
41. See JODI DEAN, THE SOLIDARITY OF STRANGERS (1996); FEMINISTS READ
HABERMAS (Johanna Meehan ed., 1995); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE,
GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989).
42. See JOAN TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF
CARE (1993); Patricia Hill Collins, Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist
Theorizing About Motherhood, in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 56 (Donna Bassin,
Margaret Honey & Meryle Mahrer Kaplan eds., 1994); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking
the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 12 (2000); Kimberly Springer, Third Wave Black Feminism?, 27
SIGNS 1059 (2002).
43. Analyses are provided in Kristen Campbell, Legal Memories: Sexual Assault,
Memory, and International Humanitarian Law, 28 SIGNS 149 (2002); Rhonda Copelon,
Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in Time of War, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS,
HUMAN RIGHTS 198 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995); Dorean M. Koenig & Kelly
D. Askin, International Criminal Law and the International Criminal Court Statute: Crimes
Against Women, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 3 (Dorean M.
Koenig & Kelly D. Askin eds., 2000).
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enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault." 44 More recently, the
Rome Statute setting forth the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
included "rape, sexual slavery, enforced prosecution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity" in its detailing of "crimes against humanity." 45  Such positive
enactments reflect feminist efforts to gain recognition of injuries to dignity
specially suffered by women. 46
Turning to dignity's relationship to legal rights, to sovereignty, and to
political theory, dignity is sometimes understood as a source of rights, a
predicate condition to exercising other rights, and/or an artifact of rights.47
Nations are sometimes argued to be the mechanism for protecting human
dignity,48 and other times seen as the principal threat to dignity.4 9 As a
political-legal claim, dignity in Western nations was once an attribute reserved
for the nobility but became (with the help of Rousseau, 50 Thomas Paine, 51 and
many others) available to citizens. Liberation theories of various kinds-
including the centrally important work in prior centuries of the antislavery and
women's rights movements 52-both pressed for an understanding of dignity as
an aspect of personhood and for a more inclusive definition of citizenship.
44. See Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I and II to the Geneva
Conventions, art. 75(2)(b), U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Annexes 1 & 2, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 16
I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
45. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7.
46. See Cate Steins, Gender Issues, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 2, at 357, 357.
47. See, e.g., Gewirth, supra note 27; Isaac, supra note 36, Michael S. Pritchard,
Human Dignity and Justice, 82 ETHICS 299 (1972).
48. See Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration and the U.S. Constitution, 31 POL.
SCI. & POL. 512, 512 (1998) ("Strictly, there are no 'international human rights'.... The
purpose of international concern with human rights is to make national rights effective under
national laws and through national institutions.").
49. See Isaac, supra note 36, at 70; Kelman, supra note 37, at 536-40.
50. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of lnequality
Among Men, in THE DISCOURSES AND OTHER EARLY POLITICAL WRITINGS 111, 166 (Victor
Gourevitch ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1766); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Of
the Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39
(Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1762); see also Taylor, supra
note 31, at 44-51 (discussing Rousseau's views of equal dignity).
51. See Meyer, supra note 10, at 5-7 (describing an understanding in the eighteenth
century that dignity was rank but how Paine's commitment to the "natural dignity of man"
and the American Enlightenment helped to shift the meaning of the term).
52. See generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS (1984);
KAREN OFFEN, EUROPEAN FEMINISMS, 1700-1950: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2000); LEILA J.
RuPP, WORLDS OF WOMEN: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
(1997); JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, ONLY PARADOXES TO OFFER: FRENCH FEMINISTS AND THE
RIGHTS OF MAN (1966).
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Coupled with the revolutionary ideology of popular sovereignty, 53 these
projects succeeded in expanding the categories of persons understood as having
dignity, although some have argued that legal expressions of civility and
dignity remain grounded in cultures of hierarchy.
54
Dignity as a matter of law is associated with the second half of the
twentieth century. In the face of the horrors of World War II and of other
forms of totalitarian governments, legal documents increasingly incorporated
express guarantees of dignity for persons. The Basic Law of Germany-
adopted in 1949-begins with the words: "The dignity of man is inviolable.
To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority. '55 The Constitution
of Puerto Rico, written in the early 1950s, states that "[t]he dignity of the
human being in inviolable, '56 as does the Constitution of Montana. 57 In 1992,
Israel adopted the Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty; 58 section 2
declares, "There shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person
as such,"'59 and section 4 entitles all persons to the protection of "their life,
body and dignity."'60 Many international covenants incorporate the term as
well. For example, CEDAW explains that "the charter of the United Nations
reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person and in the equal rights of men and women."
6 1
As these phrases from many legal documents illustrate, the law of dignity
defines it as an attribute of all persons, not only those who claim loyalties to a
specific nation. Thus dignity becomes a transportable aspect of personhood,
53. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
54. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109
YALE L.J. 1279, 1284-85 (2000) (arguing that protection of dignity in Germany and France
derives not only from post-World War II concerns for human rights but also from those
countries' aristocratic cultures of earlier centuries); James Q. Whitman, On Nazi "Honour"
and the New European "Dignity," in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF
NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 243 (Christian
Joerges & Navraj Ghaleigh eds., 2003) (arguing that as a sociological matter, the German
fascist legal regime's interest in honor has influenced the European commitment to dignity).
55. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.).
56. P.R. CONST. art. I, § I. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue
and Human Dignity: Global/Local/National?, 63 MONT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
57. MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 4. According to Jackson, the Constitution was drafted in
the 1970s, and both the Puerto Rican and German constitutions were sources for this phrase.
The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 has a textual header that refers to a "Right to Individual
Dignity," LA. CONST. § 3, but does not refer to dignity in the text. Jackson, supra note 56
(manuscript at 7-10 & n.20, on file with authors).
58. BASIC LAW: HUMAN DIGNITY AND LIBERTY § 1(a) (Isr.).
59. Id. § 2.
60. Id. § 4; see Izhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel's
Constitutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1903, 1903 (2000).
61. See CEDAW, supra note 3, pmbl.
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responsive to the practical and political import of globalization. 62 The law of
dignity dovetails with a range of political theories of the changing relations
between states and their citizenry and the obligations of political actors more
generally. For functioning democracies, all participants must partake in
conversation, accounting for their actions and views in order to legitimate
them.6
3
Of course, while many countries and transnational accords use the same
term, the nuances and valence in different languages, let alone legal systems,
are important sources of difference. 64  On the other hand, as more
constitutional democracies join together in transnational agreements using the
term and exchange views on dignity by issuing opinions examining how the
deployment and meaning of the term differs or overlaps, a shared
understanding can develop of what the term dignity entails.
III. BRINGING THE TERM DIGNITY INTO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT LAW
We turn now to the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.
With search engines enabled by computers, we have been able to learn when
and where the term dignity has been used. The word "dignity" can be found-
through databased searches-some 900 times in Supreme Court decisions since
1789. According to the Supreme Court, individuals, 65 nations, 66 states, 6 7 legal
62. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 147-50 (2002) (discussing degrees
of relatedness to more than one place, entity, tribe, and nation, and suggesting the term
"denizens" to denote the wider range of persons to whom governments may owe particular
obligations). Additional analyses of the interaction between globalization and conceptions
of the nation state are provided in T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between Principles and Politics:
U.S. Citizenship Policy, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING
WORLD 119, 162-68 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000); Linda
Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000); Kim
Rubenstein & Daniel Adler, International Citizenship: The Future of Nationality in a
Globalized World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 519 (2000); and Peter J. Spiro, The
Impossibility of Citizenship, 101 MICH L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Spiro,
Impossibility of Citizenship]; Peter J. Spiro, Political Rights and Dual Nationality, in RIGHTS
AND DUTIES OF DUAL NATIONALS 135 (David A. Martin & Kay Hailbronner eds., 2003).
63. Commitments to such dialogic relationships are central to several theorists. See,
e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); SEYLA BENHABIB,
SITUATING THE SELF 68-120 (1992); JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287-329 (William Rehg
trans., 1996); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1984).
64. See Ullrich, supra note 35, pt. II.D-E (arguing the complexity of human dignity in
the law of both countries, its abstract nature resulting in differences in opinions in many
cases, but also its influence), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol3/issI/art1.
65. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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institutions,68 personages such as judges, 69 the flag, 70 and even God 7 have
dignity interests.
But over the course of Supreme Court elaboration, the focus has shifted
from institutions to persons. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
the Supreme Court mentioned the word "dignity" only in terms of entities such
as sovereigns and courts. Moving forward to the twentieth century (when
about two thirds of the Court's decisions that use the term "dignity" were
written), the word becomes linked to persons. It was not until the 1940s-the
decade of World War II and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights-that
the Court embraced dignity as something possessed by individuals. Since then,
the Court has embedded the term dignity in interpretations of the U.S.
Constitution.
A. Dignity and the Bill of Rights
As Gerald Neuman has detailed, the concept of dignity can be found
throughout the history of American constitutional law.72 In contrast, the word
itself became a part of the vocabulary of constitutional rights only during the
last sixty years. In 1942, Felix Frankfurter used the term "dignity" to describe
the purposes of the Bill of Rights. 73 The following year (1943), writing for the
68. See infra note 114.
69. See infra note 115.
70. See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41 (1907) (upholding a state statute protecting
the American flag from being used in advertising and noting that "insults to a flag have been
the cause of war, and indignities put upon it, in the presence of those who revere it, have
often been resented and sometimes punished on the spot"); cf Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 420 (1989) (upholding the First Amendment right to bum a flag while acknowledging
the dignity accorded to symbols of the country, such as the custom of saluting the flag and
according the burnt flag a respectful burial).
71. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 525 (1952) (upholding the First
Amendment right to distribute films deemed "sacrilegious" but acknowledging that such
films may include blasphemy, defined as "indignity" to God).
72. Neuman, supra note 27, at 251-52.
73. At issue was whether federal felony defendants had a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, which the majority recognized. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter argued
against a blanket rule: "The guarantees of the Bill of Rights are not abstractions. Whether
their safeguards of liberty and dignity have been infringed in a particular case depends upon
the particular circumstances." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 89 (1942) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
The first usage of the phrase "human dignity" comes in 1946. See Neuman, supra note
27, at 256 (citing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)); see also Jordan J. Paust, Human
Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and
Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 150-53 (1984).
Reviews of literature from the legal academy also provide evidence of the effects of
fascism on political and legal discourse. See, e.g., RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 182 (1999) (focusing on the influence of Hannah Arendt on the turn in
American political and legal theory to "human dignity"); Richard Primus, A Brooding
Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 429
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Court, Justice Frankfurter explained the rationale for the requirement that
arrested persons be promptly taken before a committing authority. As he
explained, "[a] democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is
central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process. '74
Since the 1940s, we find dignity mentioned in relation to the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; the Fourth
Amendment protection against unlawful searches and seizures; the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment rights to be free from discrimination, and the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to make one's own decisions on procreation.
For example, the concept of dignity as a personal attribute of humans has
become central to elaborating the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. As
Chief Justice Warren explained in 1958 in Trop v. Dulles,75 "[t]he basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man."'76  Concern about dignity became central in the 1970s to Justice
Brennan's analysis in Furman v. Georgia77 that, in certain circumstances,
imposing the death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
"A punishment is 'cruel and unusual' ... if it does not comport with human
dignity.... The primary principle is that a punishment must not be so severe as
to be degrading to the dignity of human beings."'78 Valuing dignity has also
supported elaboration of the understanding of another form of an Eighth
Amendment violation-the failure to respect the personhood of prisoners either
by ignoring their known medical needs79 or by placing them in conditions of
confinement that are degrading.
80
(1996) (finding that during the 1930s, The Yale Law Journal published no articles on natural
law and universal rights, whereas after World War II, such articles appeared regularly); see
also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Law, Human Dignity, and Human Civilization, from Science,
Philosophy, and Religion, 3D SYMPOSIuM 297 (1943), reprinted in KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962).
74. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
75. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
76. Id. at 100. At issue in Trop v. Dulles was the constitutionality of a statute
providing for loss of citizenship by reason of conviction and dishonorable discharge for
desertion during war. The Court held that to render a person stateless, thereby stripping "the
citizen of his status in the national and international political community" was "offensive to
cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands." Id. at 101-02.
77. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
78. Id. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth
Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra
note 10, at 145, 145-77.
79. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (holding that in light of the
Eighth Amendment concerns that embody "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity, and decency," the deliberate withholding of medical treatment from an
inmate known to be in need violates the Constitution).
80. Conditions of confinement cases focus on decent treatment of prisoners, and the
Court has several times held that depriving inmates of a "minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities" violates the Eighth Amendment. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 306, 308
(1991) (White, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.) (citing Hutto v.
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Human dignity is likewise a feature of twentieth century Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The idea that searches of persons by state officials
are assaultive to human dignity can be found in case law before World War II,
when efforts to enforce Prohibition prompted concerns about subjecting
persons to indignities. 81 In the 1940s, Justice Jackson, dissenting, used the
language of dignity to explain a Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of
the home. 82 In 1966, in Schmerber v. California, the Court pronounced that the
"overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State, '83 and in 1969 that
approach animated a majority decision invalidating a search.
84
In addition, over the past decades, the harms of discrimination came to be
couched in the language of dignity. For example, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, which upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a legitimate
exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, Justice Goldberg's
concurring opinion characterized racial discrimination by public establishments
as a "deprivation of personal dignity."' 85 More recently, the Court described
Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)). The term
"dignity" is sometimes used directly. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002)
(describing the handcuffing of an inmate to an outdoor hitching post for several hours and
that he was made to stand in the hot sun as "antithetical to human dignity"); see also Walker
v. State, 2003 MT 134, 2003 Mont. LEXIS 206 at *40 (holding that the placement of a
mentally ill prisoner in an isolation cell without a working toilet violated Montana's
constitutional protection of the "innate dignity of human beings").
81. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (holding that it would be
"intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every
automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the
highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search"). This approach can be found
in more recent case law as well. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000)
(holding that the physical manipulation of a passenger's carry-on baggage amounted to an
illegal search, and recognizing the indignity of physically invasive inspections); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (stating that a "careful [tactile] exploration of the outer
surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body" is a "serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and is
not to be undertaken lightly").
82. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 198 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(objecting to a general warrant authorizing a search and arguing for oversight by a
disinterested magistrate of the scope and propriety of searches and that such a limitation was
"not too great a price to pay for that decent privacy of home, papers and effects which is
indispensable to individual dignity and self respect").
83. 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (holding, however, that the concern about dignity did not
preclude the coercive taking of blood of a criminal defendant accused of driving while
intoxicated); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (discussing the
differing "degree of intrusiveness upon personal privacy and indeed even upon personal
dignity" of searches depending on where one is).
84. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that a warrantless search of a
criminal burglary defendant's entire house was unreasonable, violating the Fourth
Amendment).
85. 379 U.S. 241, 291 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that it was borrowing
the phrase from the Senate Commerce Committee's report on the bill); see also Korematsu
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discriminatory stereotyping of women as denigrating an individual's
"dignity." 86 Similarly, Fourteenth Amendment rights to make decisions about
reproduction have been described in terms of dignity: "These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
'87
As this catalogue suggests, as a theoretical matter, the term dignity is doing
different kinds of work. In some contexts, such as the abortion and
discrimination cases, dignity is invoked in relationship to personal autonomy. 88
Understood through the lens of the Fourth and the Eighth Amendments, dignity
stands for the inviolability of persons from intrusions by the state. Because the
term dignity is usually deployed in conjunction with claims of individual rights
to privacy, autonomy, liberty, and equality under the First, Fourth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments, some might argue that dignity itself has no
independent content. Rather (and here akin to arguments that privacy is not a
distinct concept but derives from and is a form of autonomy 89), the argument
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 240 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court's
upholding of an order prohibiting persons of Japanese ancestry from leaving specified areas
and commenting that such reliance on a person's ancestry was adopting "one of the cruelest
of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy the dignity of the individual and to
encourage and open the door to discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the
passions of tomorrow"). See generally Bernard R. Boxill, Dignity, Slavery, and the
Thirteenth Amendment, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 102-17.
86. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) (holding that peremptory
strikes of potential jurors based on their sex violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (holding that a Hawaiian state statute requiring
Hawaiian ancestry to vote in elections for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs violated
the Fifteenth Amendment and explaining that the constitutional violation "demean[ed] a
person's dignity and worth" by judging the person "by ancestry instead of by his or her own
merit and essential qualities," which was inconsistent with the "respect based on the unique
personality each of us possesses, a respect the Constitution itself secures in its concern for
persons and citizens").
Discrimination has also been understood to impose "indignities." See, e.g., Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 532 (1979) (identifying segregation and forcing black
students to sit in the back of the room as "indignities"); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 446 (1968) (upholding under the Thirteenth Amendment a statute prohibiting
discrimination in the sale of property and acknowledging the indignity and violence to which
Negroes were subjected during slavery).
87. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
88. See generally Suzanne Baer, Dignity or Equality?, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., forthcoming 2003); Rosa Ehrenreich,
Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment,
88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997).
89. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1988) (arguing that privacy ought to be understood as comprehending a discrete normative
concern about control over access to one's person). For discussion of the degree to which
privacy constitutes an analytically distinct norm, see RUTH GAVISON, PRIVACY AND THE
LIMITS OF LAW 421 (1980); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45
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would be that, were dignity not a part of the vocabulary, little would be lost.
Alternatively, one might argue that the many uses of dignity demand
elaboration of the varied content, making plain that a single term does not
suffice.
We share the concern about vagueness. But the turn to dignity in U.S.
constitutional law represents an effort in legal doctrine to capture an added
dimension of harm that a particular event threatens.90 Dignity as a legal
premise underscores that the physical and mental boundaries of a person are
entitled to some recognition atop prohibitions against assault and coercion. In
this sense, dignity can sometimes be understood in instrumental terms, as a
means of highlighting the depth of another form of harm. But in other
instances, personal interests in dignity have a distinct place, constraining
governmental actions, even when potentially useful. 9 1 To underscore the idea
of dignity as a distinct form of legal injury, we used the phrase "adding insult to
injury" in the title of this Article.
Moreover, as this brief survey evidences, in U.S. law, the constitutional
properties of personhood denoted by dignity were not so labeled until the
1940s.92 Many of the concepts entailed were a part of our constitutional
jurisprudence before then.93 But the term was not. Why did the language
shift? The words changed as many persons (both outside the United States and
within) used the language of dignity to decry the harms inflicted by Nazi
Germany and Stalinism. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights centered
its proclamation on that word, and lawmakers in many countries followed suit.
This history of the deployment of the word should alter contemporary
discussions of the role that law from outside the United States plays in this
country's jurisprudence. Today, some advocates press for lawmakers in the
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and
Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957 (1989).
90. Evidence for dignity as denoting an additional legal injury comes not only through
public law cases but in the instances when the Supreme Court is discussing torts, and in the
private law context, addressing the "indignities" that persons had suffered. See, e.g., Phila.,
Wilmington & Bait. R.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 214 (1858) (justifying the
imposition of punitive damages in a libel action on the grounds that "simple compensation"
was insufficient, given that the "injury complained of has been inflicted maliciously or
wantonly, and with circumstances of... indignity").
91. See R. Kent Greenawalt, The Right to Silence and Human Dignity, in THE
CONSTITUION OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 192-209 (discussing limitations on interrogation);
Aharon Barak, Foreword.- A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 44-46 (2002) (discussing human dignity's concern for a
person as an end, not as a means).
92. As noted, some case law had addressed tortious injuries as imposing indignities.
See, e.g., Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 275 (1878) (justifying jury discretion over punitive
damages for libel to consider "the degree of indignity involved in the wrong done");
Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 214 (characterizing the malicious infliction of injury as
occurring "with circumstances of contumely or indignity"); see also supra note 81; infra
note 110.
93. Neuman, supra note 27, at 251-52.
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United States to take account of rights of personhood as elaborated in the
constitutional law of other countries and in transnational jurisprudence. A case
in point is capital punishment and, specifically, imposition of the death penalty
on the mentally retarded and on juveniles. For example, in Atkins v. Virginia,
94
the European Union and several U.S. diplomats filed amici briefs arguing that
executing the mentally ill violated transnational understandings of human
rights95 and interfered with American diplomatic efforts to reduce human rights
abuses. 96 In the Atkins decision, the debate about using non-U.S. law was
noted only by way of a comment in a footnote that the "national consensus"
against execution of the mentally ill comported with views of the "world
community." 97 In contrast, both the dissent by the Chief Justice (joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas) and the dissent by Justice Scalia (joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Thomas) objected to the mention of views of other
countries. 98 As Justice Scalia put it, "thankfully," the views of other nations
were not "always those of our people," and the views of other nations,
"however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot
be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution." 99
We disagree. The norms of the United States are not immune from outside
influences. Our review of the deployment of the term dignity of persons in the
constitutional law of the United States demonstrates that use of the word began
during World War I and expanded as the term was embraced in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other nations' constitutive legal
documents. We are not, of course, alone in understanding these effects. Louis
Henkin, 100 Gerald Neuman, 0 1 Harold Koh, 102 and others have explored the
influence of international law in the United States for many years.
94. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
95. Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Union, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533
U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), reintroduced in Atkins (No. 00-8452).
96. Brief of Amici Curiae Diplomats, McCarver (No. 00-8727), reintroduced in Atkins
(No. 00-8452).
97. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (citing the Brief of the Amicus Curiae the European
Union, McCarver (No. 00-8727)).
98. Id. at 324-25, 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that he failed to see "how
the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens" was relevant to the
decision and that "international opinion" was not a "well-established objective indicator" of
contemporary values); id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that views of "members of
the so-called 'world community' were not relevant).
99. Id. at 347-48 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
100. See Henkin, supra note 48, at 512 (arguing the influence of the U.S. Constitution
on the Declaration).
101. Neuman, supra note 27.
102. Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623
(1998); Koh, supra note 24; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L.
Rnv. 181 (1996); see also MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) (discussing more
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Moreover, the influences plainly go in both directions. Constitutional law
of the United States has a profound effect on developments in other legal
systems. 103 Despite important differences in legal culture, jurists and lawyers
nonetheless share what Pierre Bourdieu has termed a "juridical field,"'104 with a
special language, routes of communication, and modes of discourse. The
concems about dignity that we now can see so plainly in the U.S. Bill of Rights
helped to shape conceptions for many countries and the international
community of the obligation of states to respect the dignity of persons. 1
05
We are not arguing that U.S. law would be the same were the Constitution
to name that value explicitly or were the United States Supreme Court to
embrace openly non-U.S. sources and to engage in a frank dialogue on their
effect on national norm development and application. 10 6 As Aharon Barak,
current President of Israel's Supreme Court recently explained, when "human
dignity is expressly mentioned in a constitution," it is given independent
force. 107 Further, the import of this country's contemporary jurisprudence on
developments in other nations would be different were the United States
welcoming of transnational exchanges. As Claire L'Heureux-Dubd has argued,
by refusing to be involved through decisions referencing other countries'
constitutional interpretation of parallel concepts, American courts limit their
generally the interactive effects of advocacy groups, motivated by value commitments and
relying on information exchange to mobilize constituencies and affect policy debates).
103. Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 18-20 (1998) (discussing the
influence of law of the United States on Canadian law).
104. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical
Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 814-21, 828-37 (1987). That essay analyzed distinctions
between continental and Anglo-American traditions, which are substantial, whereas here we
are arguing for overlapping work and increasing discursive interactions generating a
common "judicial space" that permits distinctions by situating jurists within distinct legal
systems but also has permeability across differing juridical cultures. For analyses of distinct
ideas of lawyers, clients, and judges in French law, see JOHN LEUBSDORF, MAN IN His
ORIGINAL DIGNITY: LEGAL ETHICS IN FRANCE (2001).
105. Henkin, supra note 48; L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 103; Neuman, supra note 27.
See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEw: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
106. See Neuman, supra note 27 (describing an array of different kinds of engagement
with nondomestic legal rules). A strategic and normative question emerges about the
desirability of one legal system acknowledging the debt owed to other legal systems as
contrasted with silently incorporating their rulings. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 625 (1984) (discussing the utility of vague rules that fail to specify certain
explanations).
107. Barak, supra note 91, at 45; see also Ullrich, supra note 35, pts. IV, V (comparing
the differences between the development of German law, with an express textual
commitment to dignity, and Canadian law, lacking such textual basis).
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own role in transnational legal jurisprudence. 108 What we are arguing is that,
despite the lack of citations to the constitutions, case law, or views of other
nations, the United States Supreme Court is unavoidably affected by
transnational political and legal norms, and so affected, the Court has changed
the content of U.S. constitutional law to name dignity as a distinct and core
value. 109
B. Dignity and the Functional Capacity of Institutions
A second aspect of our empirical quest was to understand the law of
dignity in Supreme Court jurisprudence as it relates to institutions. When
doing this work (and not so bedazzled by word searches as to ignore the ideas
entailed), we considered the deployment of both the terms dignity and
indignity. We learned that throughout its history, the United States Supreme
Court has ascribed the harms of indignities to institutions (as well as to
individuals1 10) and insisted on the dignity of entities, often linking that dignity
to order, peace, security, and authority.
For example, the first usage we located of the word "indignity" came in
1821, in a case about whether the House of Representatives had the power to
impose contempt on a member who failed to appear. 11' The Court held that the
House had contempt power over its members, for otherwise it would be left
"exposed to every indignity." 112 Were members able to come and go as they
pleased, the House could not fulfill its obligation to govern. Case law also
repeatedly referred to "the dignity of debts," asserting both the legitimacy of
the obligation to pay and the power of courts to enforce the law. 113 Similarly,
108. See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 103, at 24-31 (discussing dialogic exchanges
among constitutional courts in other countries and the declining influence of American law
as the Rehnquist Court declines to participate).
109. In Molire's terms, we have been "speaking prose" all along. MOLItRE, LE
BOURGEOIs GENTILHOMME 37 (M. Levi ed., 1917) ("Par my foi, il y a plus de quarante ans
que je dis de la prose sans que je'n susse rien.") (roughly translated as, "My goodness, I've
been talking prose for over forty years and never knew it.").
110. See, e.g., Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1896) (reversing a
conviction of a Cherokee for the murder of a white man by finding that jury instructions
were inadequate to explain that the deceased had subjected the Cherokee to "the indignity of
a personal insult" and thus had provided the "first real provocation").
111. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
112. ld. at233.
113. See, e.g., M'Knight v. Craig's Adm'r, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 183, 186 (1810);
Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289, 299 (1809); Alexandria v. Patten, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 317, 320 (1808); United States v. Fischer, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 397 (1805). For
example, in United States v. Fisher, the Court raised the concern that "[t]his claim of priority
on the part of the United States will, it has been said, interfere with the right of the state
sovereignties respecting the dignity of debts." Id. at 396-97. The question of payment of
debts also sparked debate about state immunity from that form of suit. See Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), discussed infra
notes 142-61.
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Supreme Court jurisprudence has emphasized the dignity of courts, 114 of
judges,11 5 and of judgments. 116
In the case law, a repeated association is made between dignity and civic
order. We found the phrase "peace and dignity" some 120 times, mostly before
1945. One example is the 1816 case of United States v. Palmer,117 holding that
federal circuit courts had criminal jurisdiction over piracy because robbery on
the high seas violated the "peace and dignity of the United States."1 18
Similarly, the dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy (permitting both
the United States and states to pursue the same defendant for the same offence)
has been justified on role-dignity grounds. As the Court has explained,
"[w]hen a defendant in a single act violates the 'peace and dignity' of two
sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct
,offences."' 119
Dignity is also linked to national security in a handful of early cases that
address the interaction of nations. 120 For example, in the 1822 case of The
114. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (discussing the
question of the order in which courts ought to decide objections to their jurisdiction based on
personal and subject matter jurisdiction by referring to the "dignity of state courts");
Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 988 (1997) (upholding the power to punish contempt
summarily when necessary to vindicate "the court's dignity and authority") (quoting Cooke
v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925)). Cooke, a decision by Chief Justice Taft,
explained the importance of the power of judges to "act instantly to suppress disturbance or
violence or physical obstruction or disrespect to the court, when occurring in open court" as
a means of preserving the "order in the courtroom for the proper conduct of business." 267
U.S. at 534.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 219 (1980) (discussing
disqualification requirements and judicial independence, and explaining that English
legislation in the eighteenth century, protecting judicial salaries, was "designed 'to maintain
both the dignity and independence of the judges' (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *267)); Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 39 (1866) (debating the
jurisdiction of military tribunals, of congressional authority in times of war, and referring to
the "dignity and independence of the judges").
116. See, e.g., Tate v. Norton, 94 U.S. 746, 750-51 (1876) (stating that according to
Arkansas law, a claim allowed by the Probate Court has the "dignity and effect of a
judgment").
117. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
118. Id. at 612; see also United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,
34 (1812) (describing a "supposed violation of the peace and dignity of the sovereign
power").
119. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (citing United States v. Lanza, 260
U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).
120. Of eight cases mentioning security and dignity, the first four, all decided in the
early 1800s, referred to the security and dignity of nations. In the twentieth century, the
phrase was sometimes used in connection with an individual's interest in inviolability. For
example, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), the Supreme Court, relying in
part on "decency, security, and liberty," id at 479, held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination required that certain warnings be given to the accused. In contrast,
Justice White's dissenting opinion invoked the "security and dignity" of potential crime
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Santissima Trinidad, the Court relied on the security and dignity interests of the
United States to uphold its right to remain neutral. 121 This approach builds on
a historically common usage of dignity in international law to underscore the
inviolability of nation states. 122 Countries, as sovereign within their territorial
borders, relied on a cluster of claims mingling sovereignty, autonomy, and
dignity to exercise power over those within and to choose who, outside their
boundaries, could enter.
When the Court attributed dignity to this variety of legal entities and
personages (nations, courts, judges, legislatures, offices, judgments, processes),
it did so to enable their institutional functions and authority. Legitimacy was
contested, and "dignity" did the work of shoring up the institution to provide it
with the capacity to do its work.
Through reading this case law, we identified the concept of role-dignity,
based on functional needs inhering in a role. The House of Representatives
cannot govern without its members' participation. Criminal acts can be cast in
the terms of an assault on a sovereign's dignity, undermining its ability to
maintain law and order. Courts cannot control proceedings without the
authority to limit participants' speech. Debts will not be paid unless the
obligation to do so is respected. Nations cannot determine how to protect their
security if they cannot decide whether or not to be neutral. Dignity serves an
instrumental aim, enabling an entity to accomplish specific goals.
Should we find it distasteful to talk about dignity in these institutional
settings? An easy answer might be that, given the rise in the twentieth century
of an understanding of dignity as essential to persons, it is best protected by
reserving it exclusively for persons. But that approach fails to appreciate
another set of twentieth century concerns, about harms suffered collectively by
peoples when they are not recognized as having the status or the' power to
determine their own futures.
Indigenous peoples, such as the First Nations in Canada and Indian Tribes
in the United States, have demanded recognition through collective rights to
sovereignty. Dignity has become an important feature of the vocabulary of
those claims for political recognition. For example, the Draft Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples begins by "affirming that indigenous peoples
are equal in dignity and rights to all other peoples." 123 These interests are
victims, as he worried that the new rule would interfere with apprehension of criminals. Id.
at 540 (White, J., dissenting).
121. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 351-52 (1822) ("Whilst a neutral yields to other nations
the unobstructed exercise of their sovereign or belligerent rights, her own dignity and
security require of her the vindication of her own neutrality, and of her sovereign right to
remain the peaceable and impartial spectator of the war.").
122. See generally Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment:
International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1027, 1033 (2002); Peter J.
Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REv. 1 (2003).
123. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 16, pmbl.
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predicated on arguments for recognition, contrasted with historical experiences
of indignities suffered because of group membership. 124 As article 2 of the
Draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights explains: "Indigenous individuals and
peoples... have the right to be free from any kind of adverse discrimination, in
particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity."'1 25
The development of a norm of collective rights to dignity and equality
among people of various races and cultures is ongoing. 126 Its fruition requires
recognition of such collectives, previously ignored as political and cultural
communities. The resort to the language of role-dignity serves to make a claim
for marginalized groups akin to that made for individuals. Because such
groups have suffered distinct injuries to their status and because they desire to
be understood as bearers of identity and as players in international relations, the
language of role-dignity has utility. 127 Not only is the failure to recognize them
harmful to their pursuit of a collective identity but their collective identity
protects the personal dignity of individual members and gives voice to shared
aspirations. 128
One parochial example helps to underscore the continuing value of
institutional role-dignity. The power of Indian tribes in the United States is
contested, and a good many decisions address the question of whether federal
courts ought to intervene to divest tribal courts of jurisdiction over nontribal
members. 129 Similarly, many decisions address federal power to divest state
124. The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples makes specific
reference to the past injuries imposed. Its preamble states the premise that "indigenous
peoples have been deprived of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, resulting, inter
alia, in ther colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus
preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with
their own needs and interests ...." Id.
125. Id. art. 2. The Charter of the Assembly of First Nations in Canada also identifies
one of its goals as "[t]o reaffirm our faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of our First Nations
large and small." First Nations Charter, supra note 14, pmbl.
126. See ANAYA, supra note 14, at 97-104.
127. For example, article I of the Charter of the Assembly of First Nations in Canada
asserts the power of recognition of the First Nations. It states: "By virtue of the recognition
and affirmation of their mutual freedom and self-determination, First Nations possess the
knowledge and political will to respect the sovereignty of each First Nation." First Nations
Charter, supra note 14, art. 1.
128. Here, Margalit's focus on "humiliation" and his terminology of an "encompassing
group" are illuminating. MARGALIT, supra note 15, at 137-41. Margalit identifies aspects of
groups that form a mutually recognized, connected identity, and explains how "[r]idicule,
hatred, oppression, or discrimination" can give rise to "hurt, humiliation, degradation, moral
abasement, and insult." Id. at 140. On the other hand, groups may use their collective
identity to argue that their actions cannot be called into question. See infra text
accompanying note 201.
129. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that tribal courts lacked
power to adjudicate a civil claim brought by a tribal member against a nontribal state official
who had allegedly wrongfully entered the home of the tribal member); Oliphant v.
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courts of jurisdiction. What terms should that discourse take? Each system
could speak of the other in terms that acknowledge the role of the other, even as
one may have the power to trump the other. When federal courts decide
whether or not to intervene or to review state court proceedings, the discussions
are typically respectful of the state court proceedings, even when disagreeing
with and altering outcomes. 130 In contrast, some federal court discussions of
tribal courts are less solicitous of the other system's role-dignity. For example,
when one U.S. federal district court refused to cede jurisdiction to a tribal court,
the judge described the tribal court's proceeding as a "kangaroo" court.131
Return to the early Supreme Court case law on the dignity of institutions to
remember what now may seem hard to imagine: The United States was a
fledgling newcomer, marginal vis-a-vis countries such as England (from which
it rebelled) and vis-d-vis states, such as New York (which predated its
existence). As The Federalist No. 30 worried:
How is it possible that a government half supplied and always necessitous, can
fulfil the purposes of its institution-can provide for the security of-advance
the prosperity-or support the reputation of the commonwealth? How can it
ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or
respectability abroad? 
132
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that tribal courts lacked power to try
non-Indians).
130. For discussion of the desirability of deference, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 43-48 (1971) (prohibiting federal courts, absent exceptional circumstances, from
intervening in pending state criminal proceedings). For an example of a federal court
declining to cede jurisdiction, see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 462 (1974) (permitting
federal courts to entertain a request for declaratory relief despite the possibility that the
plaintiff might soon become a criminal defendant in state court proceedings).
131. Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court, 690 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Mont.
1988).
132. THE FEDERALIST No. 30 (Alexander Hamilton) (addressing in general the need for
sources of revenue for the federal government and arguing "that there must be interwoven in
the frame of the government, a general power of taxation in one shape or another").
In general, The Federalist papers do not use the language of dignity very often, but
when they do, the reference is to that of institutions. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 28,
35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (referring to the "extreme depression to
which our national dignity and credit have sunk"); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 315, 318
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that state legislatures had not been
broad in their concerns and "if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the
collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imaged, that they will make the
aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the
objects of their affections and consultations?"); THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 391, 395 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (discussing the "house of representatives" and arguing
that "[tihose who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations, will be
particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger").
Turning to the dignity of officialdom, we found a reference to the dignity of the office
of the Presidency. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 463, 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (describing the plan to authorize the President to receive "Ambassadors
and other public Ministers... [as] more a matter of dignity than of authority"). Another
mention of dignity comes in the context of courts. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521, 530
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Reliance then on the language of role-dignity was an effort to invent the
nation's authority to enforce boundaries, pursue debtors, and protect law and
order, just as First Nations and indigenous peoples today turn to the concept of
dignity to claim political capital. Role-dignity can be appropriately invoked in
such contexts, as institutions hope to gain recognition of their powers.
C. Role-Dignity and Immunity from Suit
How does immunity from litigation fit within the understanding of role-
dignity that we have developed? Immunity from suit excuses a potential
defendant from having to account for its actions and precludes an adjudicator
from reaching the merits of a claim. As a legal concept, immunity is distinct
from liability and remedies. 133 For example, a court could find that a sovereign
is not immune from suit but nevertheless conclude that, because of the fact of
sovereignty, no liability attaches or certain forms of remedies (punitive
damages for example) are not appropriate to award. 134 The common law of
immunity (developed in this country for judges, 135  prosecutors, 136
Presidents, 137 and other executive officials 138) is justified by the need for a
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing against a short term of office for
judges because "it would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into hands
less able, and less well qualified to conduct it with utility and dignity"). Further, in support
of the need for a Supreme Court with specified jurisdiction, Hamilton argued that "[i]n cases
in which a state might happen to be a party, it would ill suit its dignity to be turned over to an
inferior tribunal." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 541, 549 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
Only in the opening pages did we find an instance-in The Federalist No. i-in which
the word dignity is used in reference to persons. Publius argued to "the people of the State
of New York" to adopt the Constitution, for it was "in your interest to adopt [the
Constitution.] I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and
your happiness." THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 3, 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
133. For example, in Davis v. Passman, the Court held that the plaintiff had stated a
cause of action, implied from the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, against a
congressman who had allegedly discriminated against her because she was a woman, but that
a separate question, not resolved, was his immunity from suit under the Speech or Debate
Clause of the Constitution. 442 U.S. 228, 236 (1979).
134. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258-71 (1981)
(holding, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that punitive damages could not be obtained
from a city for a violation of§ 1983).
135. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (holding a judge immune from a suit
challenging his decision to enter an ex parte order of sterilization of a fifteen year old girl).
136. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (holding that prosecutors could not be
sued for damages for putting on testimony they knew to be untrue).
137. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (precluding damage actions against the
President for actions taken while in office).
138. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974) (both explaining the concept of official immunity, focused on whether a government
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defendant, holding a particular role, to accomplish that job free from fear of
subsequent litigation that (goes the theory) would chill the defendant in the
performance of public duties. 139 Common law immunities for private parties,
such as clergy, have a similar basis, whereas common law immunities for
family members are usually described as protecting a certain form of
relationship from state oversight.140
Defendant states (as a matter of internal sovereignty) and defendant nations
(as a matter of external sovereignty) have argued their immunity from suit.
Sometimes, that immunity claim is couched in the language of dignity.' 41 On
several occasions, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the relevance
of dignity to an exemption for sovereigns from responding to the merits of
lawsuits. An early and famous iteration, in 1793, is Chisholm v. Georgia,142
which permitted Georgia to be sued in assumpsit by a resident of South
Carolina seeking to recoup debts owed. That decision was the first occasion
upon which the Court considered whether states could be sued by private
parties. Most of the Justices, writing separately, rejected the notion that states'
dignitary interests barred such suits seeking repayment of money. 143
For Chief Justice Jay 144 and for Justice Wilson, 145 the question of
sovereignty and dignity prompted consideration of the status relationships
within the new Republic. With the backdrop of a parliamentary monarchy, the
Chief Justice detailed the differences between "feudal sovereignties and
Governments founded on compacts."'146 In a feudal system, "Princes have
personal powers, dignities, and pre-eminences,"' 147 whereas in this compact,
rulers acted as officials but, apart from those duties, had no special status vis-A-
official knew or should have known that actions would deprive a person of his or her
federally protected rights).
139. See generally Peter H. Schuck, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983).
140. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996) (addressing the immunity from suit of husbands
who beat their wives).
141. See infra notes 166-78. The early references have historical grounding. As
Meyer explains, the term dignity was often used to refer to the status of eminent persons or
to the state. Meyer, supra note 10, at 6 (citing references in The Federalist papers to the
dignity of the state). Further, as both Lee and Smith detail, international relations focused on
the dignity and autonomy of nations. Lee, supra note 122, at 1034; Smith, supra note 122.
142. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
143. Justice Iredell, writing a dissenting opinion, acknowledged that the question was
one of first impression. His opinion focused on the first Judiciary Act's jurisdictional grant,
which he argued should be interpreted in light of the common law. Finding no rights of
actions against Kings and focused on the need to shield state treasuries, he concluded that the
lawsuit could not go forth. Id. at 429-50.
144. Id. at 469.
145. Id. at 453.
146. Id. at 472.
147. Id.
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vis private citizens. 148 Given the "equal footing" of all,149 the concept of
dignity had no bearing, for its content implied the very rank hierarchies that the
United States had rejected. 150 Justice Wilson also rejected the idea that state
sovereignty enabled states to assert dignity as a basis for immunity from suit.
For him, dignity remained salient as well, but it was the dignity of the "majesty
of the people."'151 As he explained the hierarchy, a "state, useful and valuable
as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native
dignity derives all its acquired importance." '152
In his opinion, Justice Blair relied on the U.S. Constitution as the "only
fountain from which ... [to] draw." 153 Justice Blair described the wording of
Article III (with its statement of federal jurisdiction encompassing suits
"between a State and Citizens of another State"'154) as reflecting the "dignity of
a State" by naming states first in that listing. 155  But, given the express
constitutional provision for jurisdiction over cases brought by states and that,
once in litigation, a judgment could run against either a plaintiff or a defendant,
Justice Blair concluded that a lawsuit in federal court against a state did not
undermine respect for states. 156
As is familiar, Chisholm's holding was overturned by the enactment of the
Eleventh Amendment, whose text precludes federal courts from exercising at
least some forms of jurisdiction over a lawsuit filed by a citizen of one state
against another state. 157 Immunity law has been the subject of sustained
historical investigation and debate, with disagreements about both English
practices and state and federal decisions permitting remedies against
government. Some argue that protection of states from suits was not
understood until recently to be an artifact of constitutional law and that forms
of redress against states and their officials were available. 158 Others claim a
historical pedigree for constitutional immunity. 159 By the end of the nineteenth
148. Id.
149. Id. at 471.
150. Id. at 471-73.
151. Id. at 463.
152. Id. at 455.
153. Id. at 450.
154. Id. In its list of kinds of cases or controversies over which federal courts have
jurisdiction, Article III also includes disputes "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
155. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 450-51.
156. Id. at 452-53.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
158. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 126-63 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983).
159. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101-21 (Powell, J.).
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century, the Supreme Court concluded in Hans v. Louisiana160 that states could
not be sued in federal court by their own citizens (in addition to out-of-state
litigants). Again questions remained about whether Hans was a constitutional
or common law decision. 
161
Depending on the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to which one
subscribes, what has been precluded-either by the Eleventh Amendment, the
Tenth, the constitutional structure and history, or the common law-varies. For
some, all the Eleventh Amendment did as a matter of constitutional law was to
prohibit federal courts from exercising jurisdiction based on diversity, but
federal courts could entertain lawsuits against states if predicated on a federal
question. 162  This approach understands the original 1789 Constitution as
subjecting states to suit through its creation of federal power in Article I and
elsewhere. 163 Within this framework, federal judges may, as a jurisprudential
matter, decline to award certain forms of remedies against states. Immunity
becomes a common law abstention doctrine, subject to congressional
override. 164 For others, the Eleventh Amendment constitutionalizes a broader
immunity from suit for states. 165 For yet others, the Eleventh Amendment
restores states' preexisting and constitutional immunity, limited only when
Congress acts pursuant to post-Civil War amendments, and/or specifically
through the Fourteenth Amendment, and when doing so, has a sufficient record
upon which to proceed and shapes a remedy proportionate to the problems of
state misconduct. 166
Returning to the nineteenth century, one of the decisions of the Supreme
Court-In re Ayers167-had relied on the language of dignity. There, the Court
stated:
160. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
161. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988). The ambiguous text of Hans includes the
sentence: "The suability of a state, without its consent, was a thing unknown to the law."
134 U.S. at 16.
162. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 82-83 (1996) (Stevens, J. dissenting);
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment
of the Court, joined by Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.).
163. See Justice Brennan's decision in Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1.
164. See Jackson, supra note 161, at 84-86 (arguing sovereign immunity as a federal
common law doctrine of abstention and comity rather than a constitutional requirement).
165. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54.
166. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-70 (2001); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81-82 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999). See
generally Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-End Constraints on Section 5 Powers,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001).
167. 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887). Rufus Ayers, the Attorney General of Virginia, was
involved in a complex dispute about whether Virginia coupons, purchased in London's
markets, could be used to pay taxes. In re Ayers also exemplifies another aspect of
immunity law-when a lawsuit can be brought against government officials as contrasted to
the state itself. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permitting an injunction
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The very object and purpose of the eleventh amendment were to prevent the
indignity of subjecting a state to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at
the instance of private parties. It was thought to be neither becoming nor
convenient that the several states of the Union, invested with that large
residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States,
should be summoned as defendants to answer to complaints of private
persons .... 168
The Court continued that the purpose of a "constitutional exemption"
required that the Eleventh Amendment be construed "not literally and too
narrowly, but fairly, and with such breadth and largeness.., to accomplish" its
purpose. The goal was not to subject states "in the administration of their
public affairs" to judicial oversight. 169 Here, the distinction between immunity
and remedy comes back into play, for judges could decline to "interfere" with
states' public affairs or decisions without exempting states from explaining the
basis for decisions made.
For much of the twentieth century, the debate about state immunity did not
focus on the concept of dignity.170 Rather, over decades during which the law
generally moved toward expanding the remedial obligations of governments,
the struggle was about what forms of remedies (damages, injunctions,
declaratory relief, described as prospective or retrospective, and whether and
how to draw such lines 17 1) against which officials or entities 172 were
appropriate.1 73 But, under the current majority's approach to lawsuits against
states, dignity has returned as a source of an expanding understanding of states'
sovereign immunity. 174 As others have also noted, the invocation of dignity,
framed in part by the 1887 discussion in Ayers (which has been invoked
repeatedly175) requires exploration. 176
action against a government official alleged to be depriving the litigants of constitutionally
protected rights).
168. Ayres, 123 U.S. at 505.
169. Id. at 505-06.
170. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 1011, 1011-1038 (2000).
171. See Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
172. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
173. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Coeur d'Alene, Federal Courts and the
Supremacy of Federal Law: The Competing Paradigms of Chief Justices Marshall and
Rehnquist, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 301 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation:
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1259 (2001).
174. See Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence: State Sovereign Immunity and the
Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691 (2000) (discussing the expansion of
immunity doctrines and arguing that they are predicated on a misguided view of federalism);
Jackson, supra note 161.
175. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 97
(1996).
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What is the nature of the affront? Why does "subjecting a state to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties"
constitute an "indignity"? 177 The current majority has argued that dignity
"inher[es]" in the status of being sovereign, 178 and that while states lacked the
"full authority of sovereignty," they retained the "dignity... of
sovereignty."1 79 When we place this claim within our context of role-dignity
and test it to learn how immunizing a state from accounting for its actions
enables it to function, we find it wanting.
First, even when this nation was new, members of the Supreme Court saw
the problem of elevating a state's interest in dignity over individual rights,
which, in that era, focused on rights to protect property. 180 Second, when
federal judges did bow to state interests, judges did so sometimes out of fear
that state defendants would not comply with court mandates and, moreover,
that the executive would not use its political capital to enforce those orders. 18 1
In this sense, the dignity at stake was that of the judges. 182 In contrast, when
the United States brought suit against states, the authority of the executive
existed to augment the power of judges.
Today, however, the federation of the United States is firmly in place, in
part through a Civil War, constitutional amendments, and disputes in which
federal enforcement powers triumphed. Noncompliance with court orders
remains a problem in litigation (with failures by parents to pay child support
176. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 83-84 (arguing that the turn to dignity ought not
to be dismissed without exploration of its import); Meltzer, supra note 170, at 1038-41
(same).
177. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887).
178. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714.
179. Id. at 715. Evan Caminker expanded on this approach by distinguishing an
anthropomorphism to which he objected from a state's "expressive" interest in being
understood as authoritative. Finding such concern legitimate, Caminker ultimately rejected
it as a basis for immunity. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 85-86 (describing state
expressive interests in protecting their dignity as a means of affirming "the fundamental
structural commitments embedded in our constitutional system of governance matters for its
own sake, not as a means to achieving some other end").
180. See supra notes 142-56.
181. See Gibbons, supra note 158, at 1998 (suggesting that the In re Ayers decision
was influenced in part by Virginia's "resistance to the payment of the debts"); John V. Orth,
History and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1147, 1155 (2000)
(discussing challenges to the authority ofjudges).
182. See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and
Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). Jackson
identified judges' concerns about their own independence as a factor in the United States's
immunity from suit. Because Article 1, Section 8 gives Congress the power to pay the debts
of the United States, and Section 9 prohibits the drawing of money from the Treasury
without appropriations by law, courts lack the power to cut checks. If judges award money
judgments against the United States, they become dependent on Congress and the Executive
to pay funds. Immunity of the federal government avoids revealing that dependence as well
as potential conflicts.
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orders as an oft-cited example' 83), but the judiciary has less reason to fear
rebellion from state officials and more reason to expect support for its
judgments from the executive branch.
Third, and illustrative of this transformation, twentieth century statutory
law is replete with enactments undermining the view that immunity from suit is
necessary to protect either state or federal governments from losing the ability
to accomplish their jobs. At the national level, Congress has repeatedly waived
its own immunity from suit. The Federal Torts Claims Act, 184 the
Administrative Procedure Act,185 and the Court of Federal Claims itself are all
tributes to a federal sovereign understanding its obligation to account to its
citizens for its actions. 186 At the state level, as Professor Lauren Robel has
documented, states have likewise waived immunity from suit in their own
courts. 187 Further, attorneys general from several states have declined in their
own state courts to assert federal immunities available under United States
Supreme Court decisions. 188 Additional evidence of the lack of a relationship
between immunity from suit and the power to govern comes from the fact that
under U.S. law, municipalities and local governments do not enjoy that
protection. Yet they remain important venues of lawmaking.
Moreover, through both adjudication and legislation, U.S. law has also
limited the immunity from suit of foreign governments in this country's
courts. The enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in the
1970s189 required foreign governments to respond to certain kinds of claims,
while immunizing them from others. 190 Turning to trends in other countries,
183. Federal legal responses to that problem include the 1992 Deadbeat Dad
legislation, as amended and renamed the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 228).
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2003).
185. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2003).
186. See Judith Resnik, Of Courts, Agencies, and Outliving One's Own Anomalous
Character, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
187. Lauren K. Robel, Sovereignty and Democracy: The States' Obligations to Their
Citizens Under Federal Statutory Law, 78 IND. L. J. 543 (2003).
188. Id. (describing interviews and case law). That evidence undercuts the wisdom of
the Court's majority "speaking for" and assuming state interests of this sort. See Judith
Resnik & Joshua Civin, When States Disagree (Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file
with authors) (analyzing some 25 recent instances in which states have appeared on both
sides of cases before the Supreme Court, including Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), holding states immune from suits under the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
189. Pub. L. No. 94-583 (1975) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332,
1441, 1602-1622).
190. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides that a foreign sovereign
cannot be held liable for alleged misbehavior undertaken as a sovereign. See Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 370 (1993). However, the FSIA has several exceptions, including
permitting suits for actions based upon commercial activities carried on in the United States
by foreign states or for acts performed in the United States in connection with offshore
commercial activities of the foreign state elsewhere if those acts cause direct effects in the
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the United States lags behind many democracies that provide broader means for
citizens to obtain redress from their governments. 191
Fourth, twentieth century political theory also undercuts the propriety of
linking dignity with immunity. Dignity is inevitably about status, and once
"degrading hierarchies" gave way to equality in constitutional law, 192 status
relations had to be revised. Litigation is itself a useful way to express the
changes that have occurred. By transforming persons and institutions into
"plaintiffs" and "defendants," litigation confers some degree of equivalency,
for, as Justice Blair explained long ago, whether bringing or defending
litigation, one can win or lose. 193 But, as Evan Caminker has explained, the
recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence can be understood as the Court's
expression of the message that "states have the dignified status of coequal
sovereigns" with each other and with the federal government, 194 but not with
human beings.
In light of twentieth century legal commitments to human dignity that
entail reconceiving sovereignty, ranking the dignity of states above that of
United States. See 28 U.S.C.A § 1605(a)(2) (West 2003). "Commercial activity" has been
interpreted to refer to actions by foreign states that resemble those of a private profit-making
player rather than a regulator of the market. Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614
(1992). As to when a sovereign is in fact the defendant and how to assess the relationships
of foreign sovereigns to commercially owned enterprises, see Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,
123 S. Ct. 1655 (2003).
From the vantage point of the current majority of the Supreme Court, committed to the
immunity of states from suit, this legislation, representative of the "modem trend" toward
abrogation, is not relevant, because "the constitutional doctrine [of immunity] is meant to be
both immutable by Congress and resistant to trends." College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 n.4 (1999). Of course, the difficulty
with that claim is not only the various interpretative options on the constitutional attitude
toward states' immunity but also the current legal rules, simultaneously insisting on the
jurisdictional prohibition while permitting Congress, under certain circumstances, to
abrogate and states to waive it. See James E. Pfander, Waiver of Sovereign Immunity in the
"Plan of the Convention," 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL. 13 (2003) (criticizing the selective
waiver theory); Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity State
Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273 (2002) (arguing
the many means by which states can waive immunity that ought to enable, under current law,
subjecting states to suit).
191. See James E. Pfander, Government Accountability in Europe: A Comparative
Assessment, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming 2003) (comparing the failure of the
common law in the United States to respond as does the French system to enforce
government accountability and provide individual awards of damages for wrongful acts by
government); Rolf Sturner, Suing the Sovereign in Europe and Germany, 35 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming 2003) (discussing the availability of making claims against
governments in a variety of fora rather than the concentration in a single court).
192. Meyer, supra note 10, at 8.
193. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 450-451 (Blair, J. dissenting); supra
notes 142-56.
194. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 90.
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individuals cannot be tolerated. 195 Just as we see the form of dignity claimed
by nobility to be oppressive in its exclusivity, so is a dignity claimed by states
to exempt themselves from accounting for their actions antithetical to the
dignity of persons. Indeed, while criminal acts can be destructive of
governments' role-dignity by disrupting the social order, instituting civil
litigation and thus using government-created mechanisms for disputing is
expressive of the role-dignity of governments-confirming governmental
power by seeking an accounting of its use.
D. Protecting Sovereignty Without Immunity from Suit
But to require accountability does not necessitate ignoring the anxiety of
governments or peoples about their status. Respect for role-dignity can be
accomplished by a variety of methods. Permitting litigation to proceed does
not, for example, demand that all forms of remedies be made available. Special
rules-developed through statutes, treaties, and common law interpretation-
can recognize competing demands upon governments that may limit their
obligations to spend from their treasuries or to provide other remedies. Further,
legal systems can decide that, because of the demands of a role, states or other
institutional defendants can be permitted to defer their explanations of
behavior.
For example, as was argued by amici in Clinton v. Jones,196 a wise
decision would have been to permit a lawsuit against then-President Clinton but
to defer proceedings until after he had finished serving his term of office.
197
Similarly, as Justice Blair noted in Chisholm v. Georgia, certain forms of
judgment may be offensive. In his words, a "judgment by default.., would be
too precipitate ... and too incompatible with the dignity of the State." 198 Yet
another example is the congressional requirement that, when litigants
challenged state statutes as violative of federal law, three judges (rather than a
195. See also THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES
THE RULE OF LAW APPLY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992) (opposing more generally judicial
deference to other branches of government on issues related to foreign affairs); Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (arguing that the
Constitution demands such remedies).
196. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
197. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (No. 95-1853) (Amici Professors, Akhil Reed Amar, Susan Low
Block, Susan Estrich, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel A. Farber, Philip P. Frickey, Paul D.
Gewirtz, John C. Jeffries, Jr., Pamela S. Karlan, Sanford Levinson, Burke Marshall, Judith
Resnik, Suzanna Sherry, Steven H. Shiffrin, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Laurence H. Tribe)
(arguing that a private civil action for damages, stemming from alleged conduct predating
and outside the Presidency, ought to be temporarily delayed while the President served in
office). See also Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and
Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701 (1995) (suggesting
methods of providing temporary immunity for a President while in office).
198. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 452-53.
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single trial level judge) were required to decide the matter. 199 Reliance on the
Supreme Court is another option. As Alexander Hamilton explained, "[i]n
cases in which a state might happen to be a party, it would ill suit its dignity to
be turned over to an inferior tribunal." 200  In short, states-as well as
government officials-can make a variety of demands on courts to be
responsive to the obligations of governance that require tailoring procedures to
meet particular circumstances. But they ought not to be able to be fully
excused from any and all forms of accountability.
This proposition holds for the marginal and aspiring state as well as the
fully empowered state. Whether the Santa Clara Pueblo,201 the State of South
Carolina, or the United States, institutions have an obligation to appear (again,
subject to appropriate time, place, and manner limitations) to explain their
conduct. Moreover, rather than conceiving of the fact of accounting as a
diminution in authority, we should understand that exchange as itself as a mark
of status, that an institution has the power both to impose harm and has the
global obligation to explain the lawfulness of its actions.
What about anxiety over governmental power, and specifically the
concerns of states within the United States or of indigenous peoples, both
seeking recognition that they hold governance powers and both fearing
encroachment on their authority? It is plausible but, in our view, unpersuasive,
to see states within this Union as entities vulnerable to extinction through
nationalization. 202  Rather, despite nationalizing trends, states have a
remarkable durability, 203 saliency, and popularity.204 The relationship of states
to each other, as well as to the national government, has not been static over the
centuries, 205 but states have created and maintained significant authority.
(Indeed, some commentators argue that localities have a built-in utility that the
nation state lacks. Given the importance of local conditions and the power of
199. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-2283, which was enacted after the Supreme Court decision
in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and revised and limited in many respects in the
1970s. The original statute, recodified in 1948, was largely repealed in 1976. See Pub. L.
No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976).
200. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
201. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that an Indian
tribe has sovereign immunity from a lawsuit under the Indian Civil Rights Act).
202. But see Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 903, 944 (1994) (arguing that states were obsolete and no
longer the bases for political or cultural communities).
203. This proposition holds true for many nations and ethnic communities, as well does
the fluidity of certain boundaries. See generally JACOB T. LEVY, THE MULTICLUTURALISM OF
FEAR 7-9 (2000).
204. See Richard L. Cole & John Kincaid, Public Opinion and American Federalism:
Perspectives on Taxes, Spending, and Trust, 74 SPECTRUM: J. ST. Gov'T 14 (2001)
(discussing polls supportive of state governance).
205. See Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 465
(1996).
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global markets, it is the nation that is at risk of demise. 20 6) First Nations have
yet to obtain the level of protection, in texts and practices, accorded to states.
But immunity is only one of many mechanisms to protect state interests, and
one that has become obsolete-given the development of an appreciation of the
dignity of all humans.
Our argument against immunity does not ignore the expressive interests of
states and peoples in being understood as holding a distinct and important form
of authority. Nor does it preclude such institutions from using the language of
role-dignity when faced with focused efforts by powerful nations to impose
norms and mores on groups viewed as having lesser status. Rather, we urge
exploring means aside from immunity to create or to enable forms of
sovereignty.
The United States is a federation concerned about preserving the authority
of states. Several legal doctrines have developed to help ensure that the power
of states to govern remains, despite pressures toward nationalization. One oft-
cited example is the contemporary rule prohibiting Congress from
"commandeering" state officials to do certain tasks.207 Another is the doctrine
of "equal footing," which emerged in the United States when the national
government sought to impose certain conditions on territories, seeking to enter
the union as states. As Eric Biber has documented in his monograph The Price
of Admission,20 8 the United States frequently made demands of assimilation on
states, as Congress sought to expand federal power and to homogenize a
population. "Of the thirty-seven states admitted to the Union since the
adoption of the Constitution (plus the eleven Southern states readmitted after
the Civil War), almost all of them had some sort of condition imposed.
'20 9
While some of those pressures were asserted to insist on the rights of African
Americans, 210 others were aimed at altering practices of religion and the use of
languages other than English.
2 11
Most of those requirements did not produce litigation, but one challenge
did. In 1906, Congress conditioned the admission of Oklahoma on its capital
remaining at Guthrie until 1913. As this condition was debated, a Senator saw
the status implications. He commented that Oklahoma was being forced to
206. GutHENNo, supra note 17, at 45-65.
207. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See generally Vicki C. Jackson,
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180
(1997) (examining the theory and use of the anticommandeering concept).
208. Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions
Imposed on States Entering the Union (manuscript, Jan. 2003, on file with authors).
209. Id. at 3.
210. Nebraska's admission in 1864 provides the example. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong, 2d Sess. 126 (1866); Biber, supra note 208, at 1-3.
211. See Biber, supra note 208. He discusses conditions imposed to "Americanize"
inhabitants of several states-including language requirements in Louisiana (then
predominantly French-speaking) and in New Mexico (where many spoke Spanish) and
prohibitions in Utah on polygamy (a practice of some of that state's Mormon population).
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enter "the Union with badges of dishonour and incompetency never before put
upon a commonwealth. '212 After admission, Oklahoma passed a law moving
its capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City. In Coyle v. Smith,2 13 the Supreme
Court held the condition unenforceable because the newly admitted state had
not been placed on an "equal footing" with the other states. Given the freedom
other states enjoyed to decide their capitals, Congress could not so limit
Oklahoma. As the Court explained, "'[tihis Union' was and is a union of
states, equal in power, dignity, and authority, each competent to exert that
residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution
itself."'214 As Coyle illustrates, a central tenet of federalism in the United States
insists that laws be applied uniformly throughout the country and no state be
singled out for distinctive and disabling treatment.
The doctrine of equal footing works in the United States to create power of
particular kinds for states. Some commentators argue that forms of equality
across states that entail equal representation in the Senate despite population
disparities harm individual rights of representation. 215 Others complain that
states are insufficiently protected in Congress, thereby making Supreme Court
intervention both appropriate and necessary.216 Other federations expressly
provide for nonuniform treatment of the subparts within,217 and other
federations "commandeer" their subdivisions as a method to imbue them with
authority and to diminish the role of national officials.
218
Our point is not to decide which mechanism is better but rather to illustrate
the variety of structural legal doctrines and practices that are available to shore
up the role-dignity of governments. Whether by insisting on the sameness of
subdivisions or acknowledging their differences, whether prohibiting or
212. See Peter S. Onuf, New State Equality: The Ambiguous History of a Constitutional
Principle, 18 PUBLIUS 53, 53 (1988) (quoting 40 CONG. REC. 8390-91 (1906)); see also
Biber, supra note 208, at 100.
213. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
214. Id. at 567.
215. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Electoral College, Unfair from Day One, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at A23.
216. See Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAPMAN
L. REV. 195 (2001); Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be Enforced. A Response to
Professor Kramer, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1069 (2001).
217. The United Kingdom is one such example. See generally SIMON BULMER,
BRITISH DEVOLUTION AND EUROPEAN POLICY-MAKING: TRANSFORMING BRITAIN INTO MULTI-
LEVEL GOVERNANCE (2002); JOHN W. HOPKINS, DEVOLUTION IN CONTEXT: REGION,
FEDERAL & DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2002).
218. See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of
Commandeering, in KALYPSO NICOLAIDIS & ROBERT HOWSE, THE FEDERAL VISION 213
(2001) (discussing the differing approaches). Other commentary on comparative federalism
can be found in Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European
Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612 (2002),
and in Roderick M. Hills, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn 't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998).
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permitting commandeering of functions, and whether through laws, party
politics, or other practices, 219 role-dignity of institutions can be protected
without creating immunity doctrines that shield governments from responding,
through formalized modes of discourse, to charges about their misbehavior.
IV. THE MIGRATION OF INTERNAL TO EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY
What do these developments linking the language of dignity have to do
with external sovereignty and hence with international affairs and transnational
norms? We began by clarifying the forms of sovereignty within U.S.
parlance-internal sovereignty focused on the authority of states and tribes, and
external sovereignty, focused on U.S. powers vis-A-vis countries outside our
borders.
A feature, however, of sovereignty talk within the United States is the
relationship between the two discourses. Once the language of dignity
becomes associated with state sovereignty, it is likely to migrate to general
sovereignty discussions. Return to the opening examples of dignitary claims
made in 2002 by the Supreme Court's majority on behalf of state sovereign
immunity. The argument was that dignity was an attribute of sovereignty itself,
not of state sovereignty alone.220
Ought the United States be engaged in insisting upon an understanding of
itself as a dignity holder? And what prompts a renewed focus on the dignity of
states within the United States? The United States Supreme Court could
expand the scope of states' immunity without relying on the claim that lawsuits
are affronts to the dignity of states. But a more powerful doctrine of state
sovereignty has, historically, been deployed to serve as a constraint on the
scope of the international agreements made by the United States. Moreover,
given the conceptual links between dignity, autonomy, and the imposition of
boundaries on those interacting with the dignified person or institution, using
the term dignity helps to enshrine an image of a sovereign as bounded, self-
directed, and not required to engage in certain forms of relational exchanges.
The reemergence of dignity as a feature of sovereignty discourse in the United
States comes at a time when efforts are underway to create new transnational
institutions. For us, the stress on sovereignty within is related to the pressures
on sovereignty from without.
219. See Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the. Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994).
220. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth, 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
(discussing dignity in Supreme Court immunity law). Further, were dignity to become re-
embedded in United States's sovereignty law, exportation remains all too likely. The
twentieth century is rich with evidence of the portability of democratic constitutional theory
and law. See generally VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999). On the strengths and limits of this approach, see Vicki C.
Jackson, Gender and Transnational Legal Discourse, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 377 (2002).
1958 [Vol. 55:1921
HeinOnline -- 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1958 2002-2003
DIGNITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
Soon after the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
isolationists within the United States turned to state sovereignty as a reason
why the United States could not participate in a variety of international accords.
Senator John Bricker proposed a constitutional amendment to limit federal
treaty power.22 1 According to one commentator, Bricker wanted to ensure that
international agreements would not lead to interference by the United Nations
in domestic affairs, nor to social and economic policies more liberal than those
in the United States, nor serve to undermine the authority of states over such
issues.2 22 Indeed, throughout the twentieth century, state sovereignty has been
used as a defense against laws generated in cooperation with other countries.
2 23
The terms under which the United States ascribed to some international
conventions are illustrative of the effects of internal sovereignty on external
sovereignty. Many countries agree to join various conventions but with
caveats, termed reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs).224 The
United States has often added RUDs that invoke federalism as a limiting
premise, invoking internal commitment to state rights to preclude certain forms
of international commitments. 225 Thus, by shoring up state identity through
reliance and expansion of the concept of states as bearers of dignity,
isolationists gain another basis upon which to argue against various
transnational efforts, such as joining in the International Criminal Court or in
conventions committed to equality, such as CEDAW.
A recent example of such a claim of intrusion on sovereignty comes from a
Heritage Foundation Report objecting to participation by the United States in
221. S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 98 CONG. REC. 908 (1952) ("[N]o treaty or executive
agreement shall be made respecting the rights of citizens of the United States protected by
this Constitution .... ").
222. See DUANE TANNEBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY (1988)
(examining the political history of the proposal and its effects).
223. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 345-46 (1995) (discussing the addition by the
United States of a "federalism clause" to agreements that it joins on international human
rights); see also Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 24, at 666-68 (discussing the
relationship between opposition to international conventions on women's rights and the
development of federalism law in the United States).
224. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights,
and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000); Malvina Halberstam, United
States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L. L. & EcoN. 49, 55 (1997); Edward T. Swaine,
Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003).
225. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 13 (1994)
(statement of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State). See generally
Susan Bandes, Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and the "Plan of the Convention," 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 743 (2002); Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 560, 574-75 (1997).
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human rights treaties of the United Nations.226 That report, How the U.N.
Conventions on Women's and Children's Rights Undermine Family, Religion,
and Sovereignty, argued that conventions such as CEDAW promote a "radical
restructuring of society" at odds with American values.227 Readers learn that
the United Nations has come under the domination of a "powerful feminist-
socialist alliance that has worked deliberately" to undermine family values. 228
The report called on Congress to rebuff the attack on the nation's sovereignty
by refusing to give commitments and resources to various programs and
conventions of the United Nations.22
9
This stress on autonomous sovereignty is, however, painfully at odds with
the demands of twenty-first century governance. What the twentieth century
accomplished is a new understanding of the dignity of individuals and of
groups, as well as a revised vision of the appropriate scope of the sovereignty
of governments. Being accountable is as central a tenet of legitimate
governments as dignity is for persons. Holding countries to the requirements of
the rule of law is a key facet of constitutional governance, committed to placing
boundaries on the power of the state. As today's political theorists debate the
plausibility of the nation state itself 230 and the viability of the concept of
national citizenship, 23 1 the focus of a great nation's politics ought to be on how
to shift the practices and laws of the nation state such that it can secure the
safety and freedom of people within and without its borders and share in the
cooperative relational process of responding to a globalized economy.
V. REAPPRAISING ROLE-DIGNITY
The invocation of dignity in relationship to sovereignty proves helpful in
identifying the import of efforts to enhance state sovereignty. Because over the
past two centuries, dignity has gained legal recognition as an attribute not only
of monarchs and entities but also of all persons, discussions of dignity enrich an
understanding of the depth and nature of an injury, marking a diminution in
status atop other harms inflicted. Precisely because of the aura of insult,
speaking of dignity is especially useful for persons or peoples whose status and
political authority is in question.
The context of an assertion of dignity for institutions is thus central to our
analysis. A contextual inquiry into the utility of role-dignity as an attribute of
226. See Patrick F. Fagan, How U.N. Conventions on Women's and Children's Rights
Undermine Family, Religion, and Sovereignty (Heritage Found., The Heritage Foundation




230. See, e.g., GUtHENNO, supra note 17.
231. See Aleinikoff, supra note 62; Bosniak, supra note 62; Spiro, Impossibility of
Citizenship, supra note 62.
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nation states suggests that, while marginal peoples may seek to invoke it in
response to their need for status, powerful nations ought to be leery of
generating a discourse of dignity. This analysis must also be dynamic, for the
power of nations and of peoples change over time. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the United States may have appropriately turned to role-
dignity to stake its place on the world stage. Its own government structures-
from the House of Representatives to courts to states-were in need of
recognition as authoritative institutions.
Further, both marginal and powerful nations can suffer injuries to their
ability to govern and to secure safety for those within their territories. This
sense of injury is currently particularly acute in the United States, which unlike
many other countries, has only recently experienced a terrorist attack on its
people on its own territory. 232 But to infuse the harms with an additional
concept of a status insult-captured by the term dignity-is neither needed nor
helpful for powerful governments. Such nations already have role-dignity in
the eyes of the world. While they may be fearful of intrusion, understanding
such aggression as an injury to status in addition to a material injury is a
mechanism for stirring passionate opposition to perceived threats.
The United States is seen by some as the sole superpower and admitted by
all to be an astonishingly powerful member of the world community. The
United States currently serves as an example of a powerful nation with too little
understanding of the need for cooperative, transnational work. 233 Shoring up
its own sense of autonomy and authority through the rhetoric of dignity makes
less likely its willingness to engage in relational interactions in which it self-
consciously does not exercise all the potential power it has.
And for all states, powerful or marginal, being called to account is not an
indignity. Given twentieth century understandings of the dignity of persons
and of the dialogic obligations of states, no institution ought to be able to object
to having to make arguments (at some time and in appropriate places) about
232. The anxiety can be found in many commentaries and in court decisions, written
after September 11. One example is a ruling on closing court proceedings. A panel in one
circuit held that a blanket closing of deportation hearings violated the First Amendment
principle of open democracy. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir.
2002). In another circuit, a majority on a panel upheld the closing by explaining that
September 1 Ith's "unprecedented mass-slaughter of American citizens on American soil
inevitably forced the government to take security measures that infringed on some rights and
privileges. But these do not themselves represent real threats to democracy. A real threat
could arise, however, should the government fail in its mission to prevent another September
11 th." See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2002).
233. As a result, the United States has the power and ability to shape the terms of
certain international treaties, even while refusing to sign or participate in them. An example
is the United States's refusal to ratify the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court, while being able to obtain an agreement from the European Union countries
to exempt American soldiers and government officials from prosecution in the new court
once it is established. See Paul Meller, Europeans to Exempt U.S. from War Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at A6.
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whether or not it has violated rights, whether arising from federal law (as in the
U.S. context) or international law. The role-dignity claims of institutions have
become limited by virtue of the ascendancy of human dignity. Given that
democratic governmental action has become synonymous with accountable
dialogical action, requiring governments to participate in litigation ought to be
understood as enhancing, rather than diminishing, the role-dignity appropriate
to sovereignty.
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